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Abstract 
Secured nature of land tenure is of current importance among many 
factors that determines the land quality improving investment in land 
productivity. A vast number of scholarly work has been developed, yet 
the results are contradictory. This article attempts to provide a critical 
review of the available literature on secured tenure and the impact on 
farmers’ decision to invest on the land. Reviewed results argues though a 
very few has identified with no influence, majority confirms that secured 
tenure provide incentives for investment and positively impact on 
productivity. Strong policy actions can help to improve the security of 
land rights and promote socially desirable decision of the farmer to 
maintain the soil quality and thereby improve the land productivity. 
Key words: Tenure Security, Land Investment, Soil quality, Land 
Productivity, Property Rights 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘land’ in economics has a specific meaning. It is a factor 
of production as well as a natural resource. Theoretically natural 
resources are of two types, such as renewable and non-renewable. 
Resources once used cannot be renewed are called as non-
renewable such as mineral deposits and deposits of coal. 
Renewable resources are those which go on being used again and 
again and year after year for production. Thus, agricultural land 
can be used for cultivation again and again. Appropriate quality of 
soil of the land is one of the productivities enhancing measures 
14 
 
 
among the many factors that contributes to land productivity. The 
productivity of agricultural land can be maintained by human 
effort with continuous attention on maintaining the soil quality of 
land. Therefore, land in the sense of agricultural soil is a renewable 
resource. 
 
Theoretically, all-natural resources are in relation to the quality of 
elimination with a lack of close attention. Therefore, the land being 
a natural resource subject to degradable limitations and produce 
possible loss in productivity. The utility of land is obvious in the 
agricultural stage for how else could man grow his crops. In most 
developing countries including Sri Lanka, the agricultural land is 
still the main source of livelihood investment and wealth. The 
supplies of natural resource can be increased as a result of 
technological changes or through transforming into a useful 
resource.  There are some restrictions that act on land hindering the 
productivity of land. Scholars often distinguish them among four 
main underlying factors causing such harmful effect. Market 
failure (externalities), government failures (environmentally 
adverse policies), population growth and property rights failure are 
being discussed as such factors.  
Among these aspects the property rights to land and its 
associated impact on conserving soil is of current important. 
Property rights to land, play a fundamental role in the decision-
making process of a farmer in preserving the soil quality in land. If 
property rights are poorly defined, it may have an effect on the 
practices of applying land quality improving investments which 
will direct influence on the output. However, the rights need to be 
secured; hence the risk of any loss that might arise through legal 
context or the possible expropriation is minimized. The concept of 
property rights comprised with a bundle of rights and derives from 
secured tenure. Many scholars have identified the influence of 
secured tenure on land quality improving investments, yet the 
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results are contradictory. Hence, this article attempts to provide a 
critical review of the available literature on secured tenure and the 
impact on farmers’ decision to invest on the land.  
 
Security and insecurity of tenure 
 The word tenure comes from English feudal times derived from 
Latin for holding land. Tenure means the conditions under which 
something is held: the rights and obligations of the holder. From 
the perspective of society land tenure can be described as the 
legitimate manner of holding land and the behavioral 
characteristics stemming there from in that particular society. 
Several scholars state that land tenure is a legal term which means 
the right to hold the land rather than the simple fact of holding 
land.  Importance of land tenure in the legal aspects rely on the 
rights over land and its resources thus, land tenure can be defined 
in terms of a ‘bundle of rights’ or a collection of specific rights to 
do certain things with land. It is a bundle of rights simultaneously 
received by a land title holder including multiple rights such as 
use, sell, mortgage etc., and they are like the sticks of the bundle. 
The number of sticks in the bundle may become different among 
the tenure types prevails in different countries or within the same 
country.  
Tenure security refers to the degree of certainty which 
farmers attach to the economic returns resulting from their 
investments to land (Kung 2000). There should not be a threat for 
the expected fruits of the investments. It is therefore obviously 
associated with a ‘bundle of rights’ a farmer can exercise on the 
current plot cultivated. The security depends on the defined 
conditions assigned to the rights according to the hierarchical order 
of use right to transfer right. Thus, property rights involve a 
relationship between the right holder and others. It is therefore, 
need to define how property rights of land are allocated within 
societies, how access is granted for the rights to use, control and 
transfer etc., (Piyasena 2009). Without security in rights when 
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income increases the incidence of land disputes and land grabbing 
increases, and consequently tenure insecurity increases (Reddy 
2002).  
The insecurity arises from any deficiency in government 
policy that would hide the land development in a country. 
According to Ossmi & Ahmed (2015) a research done in Iraq 
presents that government policy has a strong bearing on securing 
the land rights of people. They suggest the policies should be 
placed high on the government’s agenda. What is required is a 
rather more active attitude from the matrix of legal, social, and 
economic factors linked with the land aspects. 
Economic theory suggests that these rights are complete, with the 
possibility of a corollary. Then the tenure is most secure in private 
property. Farmers are best protected from any arbitrary loss when 
the rights are clearly delineated. Delineation is the way in which 
the boundaries of the bundle of rights have been defined or in other 
words defining the conditions under which the rights can be 
exercised (Havel  2014). Public laws and private laws play an 
important role in delineating the rights.  
 
Tenure security and effects of land titling 
Many economists (Feder 1988; Li et al. 1998; Besly 1995) 
and political scientists have emphasized the state’s role in creating, 
defining and enforcing property rights. Piyasena (2009) 
emphasized that the rights in property develop social links and 
should be protected. Property rights defined with clear rules and 
regulations assure the efficient use of the land resource. It is 
generally accepted that land titles protect the rights and provide 
security, so that less conflicts in society. A title stands on the same 
foundation of currency in a country (Bromley 2008). It is a must to 
be backed by the government for the currency that is in circulation 
of the country to have any value in exchange. The currency is a 
fact of legitimacy. Similar to currency a title also become 
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meaningless without the full backing of the government. 
Therefore, a title is rather a ‘promissory note’ guaranteed by the 
government indicating it is ready to protect the title holder against 
the destructive actions of others.  
Among the various processes activated by different 
countries to protect tenure including traditional systems, the land 
titling programme is significant. Most of the developed countries 
have already applied the techniques and are free from weaknesses 
associated with poorly defined tenure systems. In sequence 
following the said developments land titling have been undertaken 
in several less developed countries. However, in many less 
developed countries, systems for titling land are deficient. In less 
developed countries and in transition economies, political 
authorities are weak or ineffective, and people do not enjoy 
security of property rights (Teraji 2008). Small holders may find 
that the cost of acquiring a title to their land is prohibitive. The 
rights are more economically related but as it deals with human 
rights it plays a role on social life as well. When property rights 
over economic resources are insecure, people typically have to pay 
transaction costs to enforce their claims on such resources. 
Transaction costs are incurred by individuals attempting to protect 
property rights (Teraji 2008). In many developing countries the 
literature has little guidance to policy makers’ interest in increasing 
the security of property rights in land (Deininger & Jin 2009). This 
is an important view that state representatives may have been 
unable to activate their power on securing the property rights. The 
discussion highlights that providing a title to land through a state 
recognized body would secure the tenure.  
Beyond the concept of secured tenure and valid document 
land tenure security is considered as a physiological feeling in an 
individual’s mind. It is the individual’s perception of his/her rights 
to a piece of land on a continual basis, free from imposition or 
interference from outside sources, and the ability to reap the 
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benefits of labour or capital invested in land (Roth 1998). Dekker, 
(2003) also states that the term land tenure is used as a legal term 
and is more as an emotional term Emotional significance of land 
tenure deals with the way, individual perceives benefits, enjoyment 
and obligations in respect to real property. Therefore, how does the 
operator perceive on the rights has become important. The operator 
who does not possess a document but used the land may live in 
fear of expropriation (Holden and Yohannes 2002; Deininger and 
Jin 2006). This implies the uncertainty in the possible loss of the 
benefits to be derived from the investment. Therefore, the security 
is not merely an issue of a valid title but also a physiological 
feeling. 
A legal system that protects contracts and property rights 
encourages investment and ensures effective use of scarce 
economic resources. It can thus be viewed as a fundamental 
precondition to achieving many of the outcomes under appropriate 
macro-economic policies. If property rights are secure, well-
defined and publicly enforced, investors of land need to spend little 
time on resources guarding because the assets are already 
protected.  Systems for documentation and verification of land 
ownership enhance tenure security (Deininger 2010). This 
documentation can be named as having a title to land to prove the 
ownership. Land tenure security is needed to facilitate the highest 
and best use of land resources. A stronger view is that individual 
ownership evidenced through fee-simple title is the ideal 
institutional vehicle for such security. The direct way in which title 
can positively affect investment and output is referred to here as 
the tenure security channel (Schweigert 2006).  
 
The economic significance of Land tenure security  
Tenure security is arguably important for sustaining long 
term agricultural productivity and output growth because only 
when farmers find it secure to appropriate the fruits of their 
investment would make that invest for long-term, most notably 
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through an intensive use of organic fertilizers and undertaking a 
range of land augmenting activities (Kung 2000). In the absence of 
a stable set of long term use and other rights, tenure becomes in-
secure, and therefore famers will possibly reduce their investment 
in land to improve the soil quality as they assign a meager 
probability to gain the continuous benefits from their currently 
assigned plots. This in turn adversely affects agricultural output 
growth. 
The economic importance and the linkages between 
tenancy and soil fertility improvement investment have been 
studied by the past researchers and still continue by the more 
recent researchers. Economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart 
Mill and Alfred Marshall, have argued that share tenancy causes 
inefficient resource allocation because the share tenant receives 
only a fraction of the value of his marginal product of labour thus 
reducing the incentives to supply labour or other inputs (Pender 
2005). 
The discussion1indicates that the way land is instituted and 
distributed may have an impact on the security of tenure. However, 
the ownership conflicts are to be resolved since the consequences 
are far beyond the agricultural production obtained from land 
(Deininger et al. 2007).  The interest of tenure security emerged 
with respect to forest squatters in Southeast Asia in about 1987. 
Once the empirical evidence was apparently established there, the 
interest in ‘unclear’ tenure spread to sub-Saharan- Africa (Bromley 
2008). Then onwards the economic importance of tenure security 
has attracted a great attention of both the researchers and the policy 
makers and therefore, the role of land tenure on soil quality 
improvement investment as a productivity enhancing measures in 
developing countries has been studied and documented widely in 
economic literature.  
One of the critical arguments advanced by many 
economists in defense of property rights is that titled lands provide 
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secured property rights (security in tenure) and facilitate greater 
incentives for higher investments in soil quality improvement 
(Teraji 2008 ;Deininger and Jin 2006; Fenske 2011). On theoretical 
grounds there are three important economic relationships such as 
‘assurance effect’, ‘collateral effect’, and ‘realizability effect for a 
positive link between secured rights and land investment (Feder 
1988; Li et al. 1998; Besly 1995; Brasselle et al 2002).  The first 
positive effect is the assurance effect. It is believed that title to land 
guarantees the security in property rights and offers an assurance to 
farmers that the benefits of their investment will not be 
expropriated by others. Thus it encourages them to invest in the 
long-term and this is called as the ‘assurance effect’. Further 
elaborations on this provision of assurance defined as   breadth, 
duration and assurance effects (Place 2008).  Breadth refers to the 
quantity of bundle of rights whereas duration is the length of time 
that sufficiently adequate to recoup the full benefits generated by 
the respective investment.  Assurance act as a bridge to build the 
above concepts. It implies the rights and duration that are known 
and held with certainty. The experience in sub-Saharan Africa, 
emphasize the necessity of establishing free hold title to land in 
order to stimulate agriculture growth (Brasselle et al. 2002). 
Brasselle et al. (2002) explained the provision of titles increase the 
assurance effect for two reasons.  Farmers feel more secure in their 
rights or ability to maintain long term use over the land, and it 
becomes a great incentive on soil quality improvement investments 
and in other hand the return of improvements are higher. Further, it 
is argued that soil quality improving land investment can only 
flourish when there is a reasonable chance of reaping its rewards 
exist (Jacoby, Li & Rozelle 2002). 
The longer the farmer has held the plot the more secure he 
must feel about keeping the plot to future, the more he invests on 
land (Jacoby, Li & Rozelle 2002; Tenaw 2009)). This is because 
that the farmer’s investment decision may be affected if they are 
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not sure how long they would be allowed to use the right. 
Especially the tenant cultivators are reluctant to make soil fertility 
improvement investments on land, as they do not live with secured 
land tenure rights that making them vulnerable. 
The second positive effect is in the circumstances where 
freehold titles are established, farmers are more able to invest 
because, land acquires ‘collateral value’ and hence access to credit 
becomes easier. Title to land can stimulate investment since it 
turns land into a mortgageable and transferable commodity, so that 
farmers can use it for collateral access. The experience in Fiji is the 
uncertainty of renewal of leases has halted major long term 
investments (Reddy (2002). The collateralization effect is 
important regarding formal lending sources which reduces the 
information cost for the lender and provides the basis for using 
land as a collateral asset (Li et al. 1998; Place 2009; Deininger 
2010).  Same idea is developed by Carter and Olinto (2003) in 
which they stated that, the effects of legally secure property rights 
on investment are typically hypothesized to occur through a 
security-induced investment demand effect (households increase 
investment when they  perceive a reduction in the likelihood of 
losing the land in which they might sink attached capital); and, a 
collateral based credit supply effect (lenders become more willing 
to make loans when assured that land pledged as collateral is 
secure) and free of competing claims.  
A land title is often a prerequisite for commercial or official 
bank loans. Without secure titles people have to rely more on 
informal lenders, who usually charge much higher interest rates 
than those on formal market.  The title can be used as collateral to 
improve access to credit for agricultural investment. A secure title 
may thus provide easy access to credit especially from formal 
lenders who do not have personal and detailed information on the 
potential borrower.  
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Third positive affect i.e. the realizability effect functions 
through improved possibilities for sale. When land can be easily 
converted to liquid assets through sale (that is when superior 
transfer rights have the effect of lowering the costs of exchange if 
the land is either rented or sold), improvements made through 
investment can be better realized, thereby increase its expected 
returns (Deininger 2003; Ali 2011). Ability to exploit gains from 
trade, enhanced investment incentives again (Besley, 1995).  
Brasselle et al. (2002) identify this phenomenon as the 
‘realizability effect’.  Deininger (2003), noted that insecure tenure 
reduce access to land hence no improvements are to be expected.  
One of the pre-conditions for well-functioning land markets, both 
on the supply and the demand side, is the presence of secure and 
well documented title to land. Well-functioning markets require 
system of property rights (Benjamin and Brandt 2002). Lack of 
formal proof of land ownership is likely to reduce prices in the 
land sales market and to undermine supply of land.  Key benefits 
from possession of formal land title for land sales are the ability to 
exchange land with strangers. The reason is that a reliable land 
registry provides a formal and low-cost way to identify land 
ownership without the need of physical inspection or certain 
inquiries with surrounding neighbors hence land is ideal for 
collateral. Land markets need to be sufficiently liquid to make a 
sale feasible within a given time. Even some profitable projects 
have to limit with legal restrictions in land sales.   
 
In addition to this discussion the same is summarized by 
Deininger (2010), who states that reducing expropriation risk 
increases land users’ confidence in their ability to enjoy the fruits 
of their labour thus making it more rewarding to manage land 
sustainability or make long term investment to improve the soil 
quality on land. It is not only reducing the risk but also reduces the 
cost in transactions in the land markets. Hence, the ability to 
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transfer lands more capable will increase the productivity. Land 
owners can participate in non-farm activities without losing their 
assets.   On the other hand, lack of clarity on tenure security may 
undermine such effects.   
At the same time, by reducing the ability to access to 
formal credit would also have an effect on demand in the land 
sales.  The available evidence on research presents that the only 
document is from Nicaragua that confers fully secured ownership 
is a registered title. Land owners in the country hold different legal 
and illegal ownerships (Deininger et al 2003). Not only in 
Nicaragua, in many developing countries have experienced the 
same situation. Increasing entry of poor people to economic 
activities is one of the major concerns of the governments of these 
countries.  Economic activities related to land are more or less 
bounded up with related to agricultural activities. Therefore, 
introducing safety policies such as title registration would increase 
the security of tenure. Deininger et al (2003) concludes that in 
Nicaragua with the introduction of this type of policies has 
strengthened the security of tenure and also it had a positive impact 
on productivity. The above discussion indicates that the absence of 
legal document such as a title deed is often viewed as a major 
hindrance to increase agricultural production and land investment. 
Therefore, the advocates of land titling and land registration 
contend that having a title improves investment in two ways. One 
is enhancing producer’s security and the secured by opening access 
to institutional credit. 
Based on particularly on the above three positive links, 
there are many studies on tenure security and soil quality 
improvement investment. Studies that have examined the link 
between land rights and investment have done well with solid 
arguments why there should be a relationship (Fenske 2011). 
According to Carter and Olinto (2003), in their study the secured 
property rights over land boost investment and economic growth. 
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The link between indigenous tenure arrangements and productivity 
enhancing investments is the key issue that most researchers got 
attracted in Sub Saharan Africa (Abdulai et al. 2011). Place and 
Otsuka (2002) noted that in most African countries, more than 
90% of land remains under customary land tenure, and lacks legal 
recognition. Further, customary land tenure institutions and the 
inadequate incentives they give to farmers to undertake long-term 
investment may hamper agricultural development. Subsequently, 
these paths have been used by economist to test the linkages 
between tenure security, investment, and productivity.   
The studies conducted on the relationship between tenure 
and investment suggests two categories of investment such as long 
term and short term. Tree planting, well-digging, surface irrigation, 
drainage and terracing are considered to be fixed or long-term 
investment (Besley, 1995; Jacoby et.al ,2002).  Soil quality 
through the appropriate use of organic fertilizer, a mixture of 
manure, decayed vegetable matter, oxen use, machinery use, 
quality labour use (additional labor for weeding and soil 
conservation practices) are considered to be short term investments 
(Smith, 2004; Schweigert; 2006; Fenske  2011). 
Critical Review on the Empirical evidences of land tenure, land 
investment and productivity 
A special feature found in the literature reviewed is, that 
the studies on the relationships between tenure security, land 
rights, and land investments, have been mostly conducted in many 
African countries.  The contribution of quantitative analysis on 
land rights and investments is also significant. However, authors 
have emphasized repeatedly the difficulty associated in quantifying 
the investment as a variable. There are two types of investments 
varied in nature and in some cases, it is difficult to identify the 
exact difference in long term and short-term investments. 
Therefore, majority of the authors depend on binary data collection 
i.e. merely asking whether the farmer do specific investment. In 
the case of the use of fertilizer both organic and chemical, a few 
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studies were able to quantify the investment. Based on the binary 
data collected, many researchers have relied on binary models. 
Studies such as Holden and Yohannes, 2003, Pender et.al, 2004) 
have applied MLM probit models. Authors such as Besley 1995; 
Jacoby et al, 2002; Smith, 2004;  Deininger and Jin, 2006; 
Schweigert 2006; Mariara 2007; Deininger and Ali ,2008; Fenske 
2011; Abdulai 2011 have used multivariate probit models, ordered 
probit models, Cobb-Dougglas production function, and hazard 
model respectively to evaluate the relationships between tenure 
security and investment and investment on productivity. 
Majority of the related empirical investigations have 
concentrated on the central issue of the effect of tenure security on 
investment and productivity.  Yet the results are contradictory. 
May be that this literature is a combination of short-term 
investment such as use of fertilizer and long-term investment such 
as conserving terraces.  Fenske (2011) states that the studies dealt 
with small samples have fewer opportunities for statistically 
significant relationships. Some studies conclude on no 
relationships, while the others conclude on positive relationships. 
Majority of studies found that the variations in tenure 
arrangements contribute differently on investments. Holden and 
Yohannes (2002) studied the impact of land redistribution policies 
in Ethiopia and found that tenure insecurity perceptions had no 
impact on purchased inputs. Though widening the scope to a 
broader set of agricultural inputs, Pender et al. (2004), similarly 
did not find evidences that land tenure arrangement has an effect 
on agriculture intensifications in Uganda.  Due to limited input use 
in Uganda, land tenure found to have limited impacts on 
agricultural production.  Also, this study emphasized, that because 
the most common forms of tenure are relatively secure and having 
access to credit is not a critical factor affecting agricultural 
productivity. 
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However, there are divergent effects. A recent literature 
survey by Place (2009) concludes that stronger land rights and the 
presence of land titles often are associated with an increased 
likelihood of making certain types of investments.  Some of the 
examples cited are tree planting, fencing and manure. In the studies 
in Ghana (Besley 1995); as well as the in Malawi (Place and 
Otsuka, 2001) also confirm this conclusion. Besly (1995) disclosed 
that tree planting may initially be discouraged by insecurity of 
tenure and on the other hand tree planting can actually produce 
greater security of tenure too. Moreover, he added if better rights 
make it easier to use land as collateral, then constraints on funding 
investments can be overcome.  Some of the results on the same 
views are themselves though statistically significant, would hardly 
qualify as important because of very low marginal impacts.    
Nevertheless, some contradictory results were revealed in 
later studies done in some other regions of Africa. Whereas, 
previous studies cast doubt on the link between land tenure and 
welfare outcomes, Smith (2004) finds firmer evidences and 
concludes positive and significant relationship between title and 
productivity in Zambia where formal land title led to increased 
investments.  This study has been conducted on a comparative 
sample of customary tenure and farmers from settlements on state 
lands.  Data collection involved in the use of a questionnaire and 
sample comprised of 266 farmers from selected settlements from 
both types of tenure. His study views that the title holders and to a 
lesser extent lease-holders have greater fixed investment and credit 
than the other category which comprised of the customary tenure.  
Similar results were obtained in the studies by Deininger 
and Jin (2006) in which they came across that more private transfer 
rights have a strong positive effect on investment in Ethiopia.  
They have concentrated on a larger sample to assess the potential 
impact of changes in property rights on investment and a 
production function has been estimated. The special feature in this 
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study is the more concentration on tenure security as the ability to 
transferability. Both studies provide important investment 
incentives but transferability has a larger impact on productivity 
enhancing investment. Hence, the study suggests that, well defined 
and enforceable rules for transferring land are important to 
producers’ decisions taking on investments. 
Bogale et al. (2006) also concludes a similar result to 
Deininger and Jin (2006), and in his study, in the absence of 
precise definition of property rights it was to induce human 
insecurity leading to conflicts between the farmers in Ethiopia. On 
similar grounds the fact that variation in tenure arrangements affect 
differently on investments is proved by the study of Fenske (2011). 
This study adopted an approach of multivariate probit model in 
Ghana and about 500 plots were taken as a sample. It was found 
that land tenure differences significantly influence farmers’ 
decisions to invest in land-improving and conservation measures, 
and that tenure differences do affect farm productivity (Fenske 
2011). He further concludes that the positive incentives associated 
with secured rights contribute to positive impacts. 
There are more studies to support the same view. 
According to Reddy (2002) in Fiji, the uncertainty of renewal of 
leases halted some of the long-term investments. These 
investments will not be made unless a permanent solution is 
produced that would provide security to interests. With reduced 
investments there will be direct negative impacts on productivity. 
Not only that but also this will reduce farm improvements such as 
irrigation, soil conservation, drainage as well as even on 
introducing new crops. The results obtained through the stochastic 
frontier production function approach it shows that significant 
differences in productivity on different tenure patterns.  The 
highest yield is recorded in crown land where the tenure is highly 
secured, while the lowest is found in informal arrangements.  The 
fact that the mean technical efficiency of leased farms is 82% and 
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in the crown lands it is 93%, is another significant result of the 
study. 
The argument that secured tenure support investment is 
backed further by the findings of Schweigert (2006). He applied 
the ordered probit model for the data collected from Guatemala 
(Latin America). The result indicates that having a title to land 
substantially increases the probability that household performs 
quality labour tasks which are associated with higher output levels. 
The study had been conducted in coffee plantation and 67% of the 
sample had a title to land. It further summarizes that the parcels 
with a title to land relatively had higher output level because title 
effects on quality labour investment. 
Schweigert’s results are confirmed by a recent study in 
Ghana by Abdulai et al. (2011). The study covers a sample of 286 
families with four different tenure arrangements. He had applied 
the multivariate probit model on the basis of four categories in 
investment. Planting trees, applying organic manure, mulch and 
applying fertilizer are the four categories. The results confirmed 
that land tenure differences significantly influence farmer’s 
decisions to invest in land improving and conservation measures. 
Secured land tenure tends to facilitate investment in soil improving 
and natural resource management. In particular, farmers who 
owned land with secured tenure were more likely to invest in tree 
planting and manure but not on mineral fertilizer. Also, the study 
examines the tenure security on productivity in which it identified 
a positive and significant effect. This is a finding that reinforces 
the significance of security in tenure which facilitates higher 
investments. As theoretically explained that secured tenure 
increases credit access, the study also revealed that access to credit 
is positive and significant among secured tenure.  
 Another supporting finding by  Xianlei Ma et al. (2013) 
is that the households in China who consider land certificates as 
important for protecting land rights are found to invest 
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significantly more in irrigation canals improvement and 
maintenance as compared to those who assign lower importance 
to land certificates 
Conclusion and Policy Implication 
According to the above reviews majority of the studies conclude 
that secured tenure with a valid document such as state recognized 
title always facilitates land investment either in long term or short 
term. Authors have been more concerned on farmer’s decision to 
improve the soil quality in different ways as land investments. 
Conversely, this investment enhanced the productivity. In the 
absence of acceptable recognition of land tenure, it is found that 
the tenure losses the required security and therefore, those farmers 
enjoy less number of rights. In most cases, the transfer rights are 
not allowed which is considered as a superior right among the 
hierarchical order of the property rights. Unprotected rights in 
tenure increase the farmers’ fear of uncertainty and thus, 
negatively influences on the willingness of the farmer on land 
investments. Finally, it should be stressed that policy-if aimed at 
achieving broadly based agrarian growth-needs to be carefully 
sequenced, addressing the property rights issues specially securing 
them either as freehold or with long-term assurance. Given the 
considerable emphasis of the impact of tenure security on 
investment, there may be scope for re-visiting the issue of land 
tenure security and transferability in many countries in issuing a 
more sophisticated set of instruments both from the research 
oriented and from a policy perspective. 
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